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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the effect of aging on housing prices. It provides a theoretical 
explanation to address the on-going debate about this issue. The analysis demonstrates that 
aging has divergent effects on housing prices, depending on the net effects of a fall in fertility 
vis-à-vis a rise in longevity on demand for housing. In addition, the results suggest that aging 
could cause a turning point in the price dynamics. Before this turning point, aging would boost 
the prices; however, after this point, the prices are depressed because of aging. Furthermore, 
inequality of household utility is enlarged during the aging processes.  
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1. Introduction 
Will an aging population depress housing prices? The extant literature provides divergent 
answers to this question. The first argues that an aging population will have a significant effect 
on housing prices (Mankiw and Weil 1989, 1991, Bergantino 1998, Takáts 2012), and the 
second opined that aging would have little or mixed impact (Engelhardt and Poterba 1991, 
Hendershott 1991, Poterba 2001, Eichholtz and Lindenthal 2014, Hiller and Lerbs 2016). The 
debate on the impact of aging on housing prices is largely drawn from empirical studies, and 
remains alive (Poterba 2014). This paper contributes to the extant literature by investigating 
the effects of aging within the context of an overlapping generations model (OLG) to explain 
the mixed results from empirical studies estimating the effects of aging on housing prices.   
The results show that an aging population can result from a fall in fertility and/or an increase 
in longevity: housing prices increase only when the net effect of the above is positive.  More 
specifically, a fertility rate lower than the replacement level will depress housing prices while 
an increase in longevity has the opposite effect. The above explains some of the divergent 
effects of an aging population on housing prices in different contexts. From this perspective, 
the seemingly contradictory views from previous empirical research can be reconciled. 
Moreover, an increase in longevity with a synchronized fall in fertility can lead to an increase 
in prices initially with the effect being overturned later, leading to a turning point in price 
dynamics over time. Specifically, an aging population resulting from an increase in longevity 
with a decline in fertility can initially boost demand for housing and lead to the increase in 
prices, but this effect will peter out as the worker population begins to shrink. This finding will 
cast a new light on the relationship between demography and economic fluctuations. 
The results presented above have been obtained using an OLG model that has been drawn 
from two separate strands in the literature. The first strand is drawn from Iacoviello and Neri 
(2010), in whose work the housing market is analysed using a Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) model. The settings of our model are mainly based on their approach, but 
are transformed to an OLG model so as to incorporate the age structure of the population. The 
second strand of our model comes from the research into land prices (Davis and Heathcote 
2007, Liu, Wang, and Zha 2013). Their insights are to separate out the effects of land and 
construction on the price of a house.  
In literature, Takáts (2012) has established a small OLG model to investigate the effect of 
aging on a ‘flat’ asset. By its nature, this flat asset is the same as the land in our model.  
Comparing with Takáts (2012),  our model incorporates the supply side of the housing market, 
revealing the differences between structure and land. In addition, the price dynamics can be 
simulated, and the results are explained from the perspective of households’ behaviours. This 
method reveals the existence of a turning point in the price of houses as the population 
continues to age.  
In this way, our paper fits into the emerging literature on housing prices using theoretical 
models.1 While this literature varies as to what aspect it focuses on, our work made solid 
progress in isolating age structure from other factors and examines its effect on housing prices. 
In addition, our paper also contributes to the literature studying the consequences of aging on 
assets and savings.2 The bulk of theoretical work in this area has ignored housing as an asset, 
a major deficiency given that housing is the largest component of households’ wealth. 
Although the work of Takáts (2012) makes a contribution on this issue, the supply side of the 
housing market is omitted. The modelling in our paper fills this gap. 
We first model the long-term effect of an aging population on housing prices, and then 
simulate the dynamics of housing prices due to demographic change. Although our work is an 
exercise that aims to reach general conclusions about the effects of aging, the parameters have 
to be calibrated to conduct simulations. Here, the parameters are calibrated for China because: 
(i) housing assets constitute more than 70 percent of Chinese households’ wealth (Xie and Jin 
2015); and, (ii) China is undergoing rapid aging of its population (Lutz, Sanderson, and 
Scherbov 2008). Thus, choosing the parameters for China provides us with a typical example 
without losing the generality of the conclusions. 
Our results show that demographic change has a bigger impact on land prices than that for 
construction, a fact revealed only when the two are looked at separately. This result is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Davis and Heathcote (2007). Specifically, our 
simulations show that a decline in the fertility rate of 10 percent from the replacement level for 
one generation (i.e. 30 years in our model) leads to a fall in the price of construction by 1 
percent whereas the price of land falls by 10 percent. In contrast, when longevity increases by 
6 percent then the corresponding house and land prices increase by 1 percent and 7 percent, 
respectively.  
We next investigate the effects of a simultaneous change in fertility and longevity on 
households’ utility. Anticipating the results, workers would have greater utility because of 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Iacoviello (2005); Iacoviello and Neri (2010); Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013); Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015); 
Ng (2015); Chen and Wen (2017). 
2 See, for example, Ando and Modigliani (1963); Brooks (2000); Brooks (2002); Abel (2001); Abel (2003); Modigliani and Cao (2004); 
and Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark (2015). 
higher house and land ownership per capita; however, the utility of the retirees is worse. 
Assuming perfect foresight in the model, the consequential housing prices would increase 
immediately before the demographic changes and decline as the effects of the fall in fertility 
take over.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the OLG model, 
Section 3 presents the assumptions and the calibration of parameters, while Section 4 presents 
the long-term effects of aging on housing prices. Section 5 investigates household utility and 
the housing price dynamics. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Model 
2.1. Demography 
The model’s time structure is the same as the classical model of Diamond (1965). The 
economy consists of two overlapping generations3, workers and retirees, who are alive in both 
periods. For each generation, we assume that the households are identical4.  
The population of workers is affected only by the rate of fertility. The fertility rate at time t, 
denoted by 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡, is given as equation (1), where 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡,1 and 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1,1 are representing the population 
of workers in time t and its previous period, respectively. Note that in this stylized model, the 
fertility rate is equal to the rate of growth of workers.  
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡,1𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1,1   (1) 
The population of retirees, in contrast, is influenced by both the fertility rate and longevity. 
Following Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Cipriani (2013), let longevity be determined by 
the share of households that survive until the retirement stage. Specifically, households live 
their period as workers with certainty, but a fraction will leave the economy at the beginning 
of their retirement, while the rest will live the remaining period of retirement. This survival 
function is given as equation (2), where 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1,1 and 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡,2 represent the number of workers in 
period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 and the retirees in period t respectively.  
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡,2𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1,1   (2) 
                                                 
3 The model that consists of multiple generations will be left for further study. 
4 Therefore, if we know the population of each generation, then the aggregate and per-capita values can be transformed from one to the 
each other. For the purposes of illustration, we will present the model mainly using aggregate variables (except the section about households’ 
utility). The equations for individuals are listed in Appendix A. 
Based on (1) and (2), the population dynamics of retirees is given as: 
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡,2
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1,2 = 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡−1𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1    (3) 
2.2. Households 
Utility 
 The households’ utility is characterized by (4) as follows:  
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 = 𝑈𝑈� 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡,1,𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+1,2� = 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 𝛽𝛽 𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+1,2)    (4)  
Following Diamond (1965), the expected life span utility of a household (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 ) is time 
separable and is determined by the sum of utility when working, 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡,1 and that when retired, 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+1,2. Two discount factors are 1) the time preference 𝛽𝛽 (0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1) and 2) the survival rate 
𝜋𝜋. The form of equation (4) is consistent with the practice that survival rates are involved.5 
The utility during work (𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡,1) is given as: 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡,1 = ln�𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,1� + 𝑗𝑗ℎ ln�ℎ𝑡𝑡,1� + 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ln (𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡,1) − 𝜏𝜏1+𝜂𝜂 (𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡1+𝜉𝜉 + 𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡1+𝜉𝜉)1+𝜂𝜂1+𝜉𝜉  (5)  
Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), the terms providing 
positive utility in (5) are per capita consumption of goods, 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,1, structure of houses, ℎ𝑡𝑡,1, and 
land, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡,1 . Here, we argue land is a part of the utility function because it is a necessary 
component of the housing. For example, the houses that occupy bigger land (villas) will 
provide extra utility for the residents compared to those with smaller land area (e.g. 
apartments). The disutility comes from working. Variables  𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  and 𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡  represent hours 
worked in non-housing and housing sectors respectively.  
The parameters 𝑗𝑗ℎ and 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 represent the preference for house and land respectively, and the 
parameter 𝜏𝜏 denotes the dis-preference of labor supply. The parameter 𝜂𝜂 > 0 ensures that the 
utility function is concave with respect to labor supply. In addition, the parameter  𝜉𝜉 > 0 
indicates the labor mobility between the two production sectors is imperfect (Horvath 2000, 
Iacoviello and Neri 2010).  
The utility function for the retirees, who do not participate in the labour market, is analogous 
to (5); that is,  
                                                 
5 See, for example, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Cipriani (2013) and Muto, Oda, and Sudo (2016) 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡+1,2 = ln�𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1,2� + 𝑗𝑗ℎ ln�ℎ𝑡𝑡+1,2� + 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ln (𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡+1,2)    (6) 
where the consumption, house and land per capita of this generation are denoted by 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1,2, 
ℎ𝑡𝑡+1,2 and 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡+1,2 respectively.  
Budget Constraint 
 The budget constraint for each generation is illustrated separately. Although households 
make decisions based on individual budget constraints, we follow Diamond (1965) to present 
the aggregate equations here for illustration, and the per capita version of the model is shown 
in Appendix A.  
The aggregate budget constraint for the workers is as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,1 = (1 − 𝑇𝑇)(𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡),  (7)  
where the right side is the aggregate income of the workers and the left side is the expenditures. 
The total income of workers can be divided into wage, 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁ℎ,𝑡𝑡, and dividend, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡, 
income. Workers pay tax of T, and thus the fraction (1 − 𝑇𝑇) is the share of the total income 
kept by the workers while the remainder accrues to the retirees. One could rationalize the 
specification of ‘T’ in (7) as a pay-as-you-go pension system where the current generation of 
workers are taxed to fund consumption of the retirees. 
Total expenditure is 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,1. We have excluded saving of households under 
the assumption that it equals the value of loans to the firms which are owned by the households, 
and so the returns are in the form of profits. 
The aggregate budget constraint for the retirees is as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1,2 + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡+1,2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,2 = 𝑇𝑇�𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+1𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1𝑁𝑁ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1� + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1(1 −
𝛿𝛿ℎ)(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,2) + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,2)     (8) 
The right part of (8) is the total income of retirees, while the left part is expenditures. The 
revenues accruing to the retirees have some differences with that of workers because the 
revenues consist of three parts: 1) the pension payments; 2) the wealth accumulated previously; 
and 3) inheritances. For the pension system, the retirees receive a share of the wage and profit 
revenues of all the households as explained above. They also have income from accumulated 
wealth in the form of houses and lands that they purchased while working.  
Moreover, inheritance is an additional component of income of retirees. The inheritance is 
the wealth that the households didn’t consume when they passed away, and is assumed to be 
transferred to the retirees. The inheritance is in the form of houses (and land) and assumed to 
be so for three reasons. First, housing is needed by every individual, including the retired. 
Second, houses cannot be fully consumed by their owners, even at the time of their death. 
Third, houses are bequeathed to the next generation. For example, during the study of the 
bequest decision of Australians, Ding (2012) stated that housing assets constitute the bulk of 
bequests.  
In our model, inheritance comes from two sources: 1) the previous generation of retirees; and 
2) the workers who do not survive to retirement. The market values of these two parts are 
𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ)𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,2  and (1 − 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1)(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ)𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,1) respectively, 
where 𝛿𝛿ℎ represents that rate of depreciation of houses. Meanwhile, the market value of house 
and land purchased during their working period is 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1(𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ)𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,1). Thus, 
the total market value of the housing wealth is obtained by adding these parts together and is 
represented as 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ)(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,2) + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,2). 
2.3. Firms 
The other agent in the economy is the firms. We adapt the model in Liu, Wang, and Zha 
(2013) where firms are assumed to exist forever, and they have three important functions. The 
first is that they produce goods for consumption and housing, and this function will be 
illustrated in the section on technology. Furthermore, the firms invest in and maintain plant and 
equipment. Finally, firms maximize profits with the proceeds paid to households in the form 
of dividends. 
Profit maximization 
 Following Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), firms maximize long-run profits, denoted as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀� 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒
𝑡𝑡 ln (𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡    (9) 
, where 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 represents the total profits of the firms in period t. In addition, the parameter 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒 
represents the time preference of firms. As is widely accepted in practice, the time preference 
of firms would be lower than that of the households, i.e. 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒 < 𝛽𝛽, thus they invest (Iacoviello 
2005, Liu, Wang, and Zha 2013, Iacoviello 2015).  
A major modification from Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) is that, in our model, the firms are 
assumed to be owned by all the households as a whole instead of a certain fraction of them6. 
                                                 
6 Although firms are owned by households, the aim function of firms shows a lower discount rate. We provide a microeconomic 
explanation to this setting. In this explanation, the whole economy is viewed as a big firm, and it acts according to our model. However, the 
whole economy consists of many small firms, and each of them is owned by a panel of households. The time that the panel can own this firm 
will be no more than the longevity of households (because only living people can be on the panel). If taking the uncertainty into consideration, 
This modification will allow us to focus on the households’ heterogeneity of age structures 
without adding the complication of income distribution. Without this modification, as shown 
in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), the entrepreneurs would be introduced as a distinct class from 
the employees.  
Two more assumptions are added; namely: 1) more profit is always better; and 2) stable profit 
flow is preferred. The first is standard practice in such models, while the second follows from 
risk-aversion by households who own these firms (Sandmo 1971, Leland 1972, Oh, Rhodes, 
and Strong 2016). The log-function in (9) satisfies these assumptions. 
Technologies 
 An often cited omission from previous research on the effect of aging population on housing 
prices is the supply side of the market (Swan 1995). We follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and 
treat the supply of housing as a separable production sector from the non-housing productions.  
Non-housing production sector: The non-housing sector uses Cobb-Douglas technology of 
the form: 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐    (10) 
The non-housing production is denoted by 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡, and there are three types of variables involved 
in the production process:  the aggregate capital of non-housing production sector, 𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1; the 
labor employed, 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡; and the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in the non-housing production 
sector, 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡.  
Housing production sector: Similar to that of the non-housing production sector, housing 
production takes the form: 
IH𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1𝜇𝜇ℎ 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑁ℎ,𝑡𝑡1−𝜇𝜇ℎ−𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙     (11) 
The houses built by the housing production sector is denoted by IH𝑡𝑡. The construction of 
houses needs capital 𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1, land (which is owned by the firms) 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1, and labor 𝑁𝑁ℎ,𝑡𝑡 while 
TFP growth is denoted by 𝐴𝐴ℎ,𝑡𝑡.  Following the work of Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we assume 
the land is indispensable for the production of housing.  
                                                 
the existent time of a firm (owned by the same panel) will be strictly less than the longevity of households. Thus, the firm owners, although 
they are households, will be more impatient about the future of firms than their own lives. This explanation is consistent with the reality that 
the survival rates of firms are less than that of the households. Consequently, the whole economy as a big firm will have a lower discount rate 
of time than that of the households because it consists of these firms. Regarding the households, we suppose that they have full insurance on 
their wage and profits, thus their income will only relate with the performance of the whole economy. 
Capital Accumulation 
We denote the investments in non-housing and housing sectors in period t as IK𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 and IKℎ,𝑡𝑡 
respectively. Following Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), the capital accumulation processes for the 
non-housing and housing sectors are assumed to have the following specifications: 
𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿kc)𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 + IK𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 − Φ𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡     (12)  
𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿kh)𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1 + IKℎ,𝑡𝑡 − Φℎ,𝑡𝑡    (13) 
where parameters 𝛿𝛿kc and 𝛿𝛿kh represent the depreciation rates of capital in the non-housing and 
housing sectors respectively. In addition, variables Φ𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 and Φℎ,𝑡𝑡 denote the adjustment cost 
during the accumulation7. 
Regarding the adjustment cost in investments, we follow the work of Iacoviello and Neri 
(2010) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) and assume that they have the following specifications: 
Φ𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = Φ𝑐𝑐�𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1� = 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐2 ( 𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾,𝑡𝑡)2𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1   (14) 
Φℎ,𝑡𝑡 = Φℎ�𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1� = 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘ℎ2 ( 𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾,𝑡𝑡)2𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1   (15) 
where 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐  and 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘ℎ  are the parameters that represent the specific frictions in adjusting the 
capital stocks in non-housing and housing sectors respectively. In addition, variables 𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾,𝑡𝑡 and 
𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾,𝑡𝑡 denote the balanced capital growth rates on which the corresponding adjustment cost 
would be zero. 
Budget Constraint 
 The budget constraint of the firms is as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 + Φ𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + Φℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 IH𝑡𝑡 + 1−𝛿𝛿kc𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 +(1 − 𝛿𝛿kh)𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1     (16) 
The right side of the (16) is the resources available to the firms while the left side is the 
payments for the above. Firms have revenues from: 1) selling non-housing and housing 
productions; 2) the balance of capital after depreciation, and 3) the market value of land owned 
                                                 
7 In the long run, the adjustment cost is the accumulation of the adjustment costs in short runs. The adjustment cost of capital includes  
opportunity costs of underutilized capital, capital obsolete and transition costs among activities (de Córdoba et al. 2006). These costs that 
happen in the short run will not vanish in the long run. Thus, the adjustment cost in the long run here refers to the sum of them. 
by the firm. For the capital in the non-housing sector, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the 
investment specific technology shock is introduced to the model and denoted by 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡.  
The distribution of this wealth can be divided into four parts. Firstly, firms pay profits to 
households, as denoted by 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 in (16). Secondly, the capital stocks for next period are decided 
by the firms, which are denoted as 𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 and 𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡. Along with this process, the capital adjustment 
costs are involved (Φ𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 and Φℎ,𝑡𝑡). Thirdly, wages are paid to the workers. Lastly, the firms 
will decide on the amount of land owned in this period.  
2.4. Equilibrium 
There are four markets in our model, which are 1) the non-housing production market, 2) the 
housing market, 3) the land market, and 4) the labor market. The markets are perfectly 
competitive8. The equilibrium conditions of the first three markets are: 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + IK𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + IKℎ,𝑡𝑡 + Φ𝑡𝑡     (17)   
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = IH𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ)𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1    (18) 
𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡     (19) 
Where 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,2, 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡,2, 𝐿𝐿ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿ℎ,𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝐿𝐿ℎ,𝑡𝑡,2 
For the labor market, its equilibrium means the labor supply of households would be equal 
to the labor demand of firms. This equilibrium amount of working hours has been denoted by 
𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑁𝑁ℎ,𝑡𝑡 in the previous discussion (or per worker, 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡). 
3. Assumptions and Calibration 
3.1. Demographic Assumptions 
In this research, we study both the effects of a decline in the fertility rate and an increase in 
longevity on housing prices. The levels of the decline and increase are arbitrarily chosen; 
however, the analysis on them will be sufficient to reach the qualitative conclusions relating to 
our research question.  
The timeline chart of the assumed demographic changes is given as follows: 
                                                 
8 The firms have profit because they own capitals. 
 
Figure 1. Timeline Chart of the Demographic Changes 
 
Figure 2. Overall Effect: Demography Changes 
Specifically, at the original state, fertility rate (denoted by variable n) is set at the replacement 
level. The first shock is a fall in the fertility rate of 10 percent in period 3 (Figure 2a), and this 
fall is foreseen by the agents of the economy beforehand. In period 4, the fertility rate is 
returned to the replacement level as its original state and kept stable from then on (Figure 2a).  
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The second shock is an increase in longevity, which is presented in Figure 2b. In period 3, 
the longevity increases and reaches its peak. Thereafter, the longevity is assumed to be 
constant. Again, the longevity changes are known by the agents of the economy beforehand. 
The total longevity increase during this transition is 5.56 percent, indicating the corresponding 
survival rate is raised from 0.8 to 0.9.  
By assuming both the changes begin at the same time within the range above, the overall 
demographic changes are shown in Figure 2. The population of workers has declined (Figure 
2c), while the population of retirees has a sharp rise from period 2 to 3, and a fall follows from 
period 3 to 4 before reaching a stable value in period 4 (Figure 2d). During this process, the 
proportion of retirees rises from period 2 to 3. After that, it declines and then stays the same 
(Figure 2f). 
3.2. Parameter Calibration 
To present the result numerically, the parameters have to be calibrated. In this paper, we 
calibrate the parameters to fit the case of China. As illustrated above, the case of China will be 
a typical example when examining the effects of ageing on housing prices. 
There are 16 parameters in our model. In Table 1, their calibrated values are listed, as well 
as the sources of the calibration. 
The time preference of households 𝛽𝛽 is calibrated to match China’s average real interest 
rates during 1980–20159. According to World Development Indicator of the World Bank10, 
this rate, rounded to two decimal places, is 2 percent, which indicates the annual discount 
factor of 0.98, and for a period of thirty years, we set 𝛽𝛽 = 0.55. Besides, following Iacoviello 
and Neri (2010) and Ng (2015), the annual discount rate of firms is set as 0.958 
(=0.98/1.0232), lower than that of the households. In thirty years, the corresponding discount 
rate of firms 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒 is 0.275. 
There are three depreciation rates in our model. For the two types of capital in the production 
sectors, their annual depreciation rates are about 10 percent (Iacoviello and Neri 2010, Ng 
2015). In thirty years, this depreciation rate implies that the capitals are fully depreciated. Thus, 
the corresponding parameters 𝛿𝛿kc and 𝛿𝛿kh are calibrated as 1. The depreciation rate of houses 
                                                 
9 Follow Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Muto, Oda, and Sudo (2016), the survival rates in the utility function do not influence the 
calibration methods of the parameter of time preference. 
10World Development Indicator of the World Bank: Real interest rate.  
 Website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR. Date of Access: 21/Apr/2017 
is calibrated according to Iacoviello and Neri (2010) as 4 percent annually11, indicating 70 
percent depreciation in 30 years. 
The parameters denoting income shares and weight of utility are calibrated according to Ng 
(2015) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013). Their values are listed in Table 1: the capital share in 
housing sector (𝜇𝜇ℎ) is set at 0.2412. The capital adjustment cost in the non-housing and housing 
sector is calibrated according to Ng (2015), and the values are reported in Table 1. Among all 
the parameters, the value of pension share 𝑇𝑇 of China has not been found in similar studies. 
Here, we use the case of America as an alternative, and the value is calibrated according to the 
work of Iacoviello and Pavan (2013). 
Table 1—Parameter Calibration of the Model 
Description Symbols Values Sources 
Time preference of households 𝛽𝛽 0.55 See text 
Time preference of firms 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒 0.275 See text 
Capital share  
(non-housing sector) 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 0.46 Ng (2015) 
Capital share  
(housing sector) 𝜇𝜇ℎ 0.24 See text 
Land share  
(housing sector) 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙 0.10 Ng (2015) 
Adjustment Friction 
(non-housing sector) 𝜙𝜙kc 11 Ng (2015) 
Adjustment Friction 
(housing sector) 𝜙𝜙kh 10 Ng (2015) 
Capital depreciation 
(non-housing sector) 𝛿𝛿kc 1 Ng (2015) 
Capital depreciation 
(housing sector) 𝛿𝛿kh 1 Ng (2015) 
House depreciation 𝛿𝛿ℎ 0.7 Iacoviello and Neri (2010) 
Weight on housing in utility 𝑗𝑗ℎ 0.12 Ng (2015) 
Weight on land in utility 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 0.045 Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) 
Dis-preference on Labour supply 𝜏𝜏 1 Ng (2015) 
See text 𝜂𝜂 0.5 Ng (2015) 
See text 𝜉𝜉 1 Ng (2015) 
Pension share 𝑇𝑇 0.4 Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) 
 
4. Long-Term Projection 
A decline in fertility rate and an increase in longevity are both important underlying forces 
for aging of the population. We investigate the long-term effects of these two separately at first, 
and then combine them together to assess the aggregate changes. More concretely, since the 
                                                 
11 We did not use this parameter value in Ng (2015) because that value indicates the houses will close to be fully depreciated in 30 years, 
and this is not true in the reality. Thus, we use the parameter value in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) instead. 
12 Comparing with Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Ng (2015), the intermediate input has been omitted here, and the share of this input is 
added to the capital. 
long run effect could be reflected by trend or steady state changes, we are here looking for the 
specific values of these changes. 
4.1. Fertility Rate Decline 
The fertility rate decline will cause trends in the values of variables (see Appendix B). 
Among them, the trend growth rates of house and land prices have the following closed form 
solutions (the derivations are provided in Appendix B): 
𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞,𝑡𝑡 = 1−𝜇𝜇ℎ1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾ac,t − 𝛾𝛾ah,t + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐(1−𝜇𝜇ℎ)1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾ak,t + 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙�𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡�    (20) 
𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = 11−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 +  𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + (𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡)    (21) 
The meanings of the variables are listed in Table 2: 
Table 2—Exogenous Variables in Trends 
𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁 Growth rate of worker population 
𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿 Growth rate of residential land area 
𝛾𝛾ac Growth rate of TFP in non-housing sector 
𝛾𝛾ah Growth rate of TFP in housing sector 
𝛾𝛾ak Growth rate of investment specific technology 
Specifically, the trend caused by fertility rate changes is reflected by the following equations, 
which neglect other exogenous variables from equations (20) and (21). 
𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡    (22) 
𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡   (23) 
The only parameter in equation (22) is 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙 , which represents the share of land in house 
construction. This parameter, as assumed in the previous section, has the range of 0 < 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙 < 1. 
Therefore, the effect of adjusting  𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁 would be bigger on the land price than that of the house.  
The fertility rate 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 is not shown in these formulas directly; however, the variables 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁 and 
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡  have the relationship  𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 = exp(𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡) . Thus, when 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡 = 0 , the fertility rate is on 
replacement level, and worker population stays stable. A negative 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁  implies a decline in 
fertility rate, and so the worker population contracts. Accordingly, the proportion of retirees 
would increase commensurately.  
In this circumstance, the replacement level of fertility rate is essential for the price trends. If 
the fertility rate remains higher than the replacement level, then the prices would rise as a result. 
In contrast, if the fertility rate stays lower than the replacement level, then the price falls. These 
effects from a fall in the fertility rate end with a return to its replacement level.  
The following result derived from (22) and (23) would sum up the discussion above:  
Result 1: A decline in the fertility rate lowers the house and land prices in the long run. 
Moreover, when 0 < 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙 < 1, the effect on the land price would be bigger than that on the 
house. 
The mechanisms from fertility rate to prices is presented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Causal Chain from Fertility Rate to Prices 
In the first step, the fertility rate decline would lead to a contraction in the population of 
workers which then affects land and house prices. We will take the land price as an example to 
illustrate this effect. First, when worker population declines, the land price would fall because 
of reduced demand. Second, the decline in the population of workers will lead to a decline in 
non-housing production. Note that the land price is a relative price and is denoted by the units 
of non-housing production. Thus, when the output declines, the land price would decline 
accordingly.  
What about the price of houses? First note that house construction is endogenous in our 
model. Thus, the changes in population and productions may not influence the house price 
because of the flexibility of supply. However, land is an input in house construction and thus a 
fall in the price of land will be transmitted to the house price. As shown in (22), the parameter 
𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙 denotes the share of land, which is also the share of price transmission. Since 0 < 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙 < 1, 
the decline in house price is less than that of land. 
Finally, the mechanisms illustrated above would indicate the price trend decline would 
happen along with the shrinkage of worker population, and the value of the decline can be 
calculated from equations (22) and (23). Substituting in the parameters from the previous 
section, the trends of house/land price are shown in Figure 4, where their values decline by 1 
percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
Fertility rate Worker  Population Land price 
House price 
Non-housing Production 
 
Figure 4. Price Changes: Long-Term Effect of Fertility Rate Decline 
Notes: The corresponding demographic changes are shown in Figure 2a.  
4.2. Longevity Increase 
Different from the fertility rate, the effect of an increase in longevity has no impact on price 
trends as shown by equations (20) and (21), thus a change in longevity affects the steady state 
prices instead.  
There are three ways of calculating the effect on steady states: derive the analytical solution, 
calculate the partial derivative from the above, or use numerical simulations when the above is 
not practical. The first two have proved difficult thus numerical simulations have been 
employed. By using parameter values and the changes in longevity, this method permits the 
calculation of steady values for the endogenous variable.  
Here, by using the calibrated parameters and assumptions in the previous section, the 
numerical solution is presented to show the long-term effect of an increase in longevity. The 
robustness of the results is tested as explained in Appendix E.  The results of the numerical 
solution are shown in Figure 5. The effects of an increase in the survival rate from 0.8 to 0.9 
are calculated and plotted in this figure: it shows a positive elasticity of price to an increase in 
longevity.  
This result indicates that, for plausible calibrations of the structural parameters of the 
economy, the long-term effects of an increase in longevity on the prices is positive. In addition, 
as shown in Figure 5, the rise in the price of land is higher than that of the house. Thus, for the 
given parameters, the long-term effect of an increase in longevity on land price is larger than 
that on the house.  
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Figure 5. Price Changes: Long-Term Effects of Longevity Increase 
Notes: the survival rate is incremented by 0.1 to derive the corresponding steady state prices for house and land separately.  
 
Result 2: the long-run effect of an increase in longevity is positive on both house and land 
prices. Moreover, its effect on the land price is bigger than that on the house price. 
4.3. Overall 
We next investigate combined effects of a fall in the fertility rate and an increase in longevity. 
More concretely, when using the assumed demographic changes in the previous section, their 
overall effects on the prices are shown in Table 3. 
In the long run, the house price rises by 0.07 percent. This rise indicates that, conditional on 
the values of the assumed parameters, the positive effect on house price from an increase in 
longevity is greater than the negative effect from the fall in fertility. In contrast, the land price 
declines by 2.39 percent. Thus, the negative effect of the simulated fall in fertility outweighs 
the positive effect from the simulated increase in longevity.  
Table 3—Prices Changes: Long-Term Effect of Aging Population (in percent) 
 
effect of 
 fertility rate decline 
effect of  
longevity increase 
overall 
effect 
house price -1.00 1.07 0.07 
land price -10.00 7.61 -2.39 
Note: the numbers come from Figure 4 and 5, and the overall effect is the sum of the two. The justification of this 
method is shown in Appendix D. 
These offsetting effects can be deduced from Result 1 and Result 2. Recall from Result 1, 
the long-term effect of fertility rate decline on prices is negative; however, in Result 2, the 
long-term effect of longevity increase on prices is positive. Because these two effects move in 
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opposite directions, the net effect depends on which of the above is overwhelming. 
Furthermore, if we manipulate the extent of fertility rate decline, these opposing effects could 
be studied more closely for specific parameter values. 
As shown in Figure 6, the Cartesian plane consists of the fertility rate decline (y-axis) and 
longevity increase (x-axis). The line pictured in the plane is a set of points, denoting 
combinations of fertility rate decline and longevity increase. For house price, on this line, the 
upward effect from longevity increase equals the downward effect from fertility rate decline. 
That is, the net effect of an aging population on house prices is zero on this line. 
Moreover, the line pictured in Figure 6 is also a dividing line. It divides the quadrant of the 
plane into two parts. On the right side of the line, the house price will rise in the long run, 
because of the stronger effect from an increase in longevity. However, on the left side of the 
line, the house price will decline due to the weight of fertility rate decline. 
  
Figure 6. Plane of Aging Population and Balance Line of House Price 
Notes: The effect of longevity increase on house price comes from Figure 5, and the corresponding fertility rate decline is 
calculated according to (22). 
For land price, a similar plane is shown in Figure 7, together with a line, on which the long-
term effect of aging population is zero. Similar to that of the house price, the quadrant is also 
divided into two parts by this balance line, and its right / left side would be the upward / 
downward area for the land price.  
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Figure 7. Plane of Aging Population and Balance Line of Land Price 
Notes: The effect of longevity increase on land price comes from Figure 5, and the corresponding fertility rate decline is 
calculated according to (23). 
Lastly, notice that the balance lines of house and land prices do not coincide with each other, 
which is shown in Figure 8. Thus, the zero long-run effect cannot be achieved for both the 
prices simultaneously. Moreover, the quadrant is divided into three areas by two different lines. 
Because the areas preserved the properties as in Figure 6 and 7, the right most area is where 
both land and house prices rise while left-most region is where both prices fall. The middle 
area lends room for the two prices to diverge: specifically where the price of land drops while 
that for houses increase. The parameters assumed in the simulations are those for this specific 
region as shown in Table 3. 
 
Figure 8. Plane of Aging Population and Balance Line of Land Price 
Notes: source from Figure 6 and 7. 
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To sum up, the discussion above could be highlighted by the following result: 
Result 3: the aging population could have zero effect on either house or land price in the 
long run. 
5. Simulation 
In this section, we will simulate the economic effects of the demographic changes presented 
in Figure 2. Specifically, the simulations provide the dynamics in terms of household utility 
and housing prices during the transition periods. From these dynamics, we explain how the 
demographic changes and economic fluctuations are interconnected. 
5.1. Households’ Utility 
Recall that household utility is determined by the non-housing consumption and house and 
land owned per capita. If we divide the households into workers and retirees, their per capita 
utility is shown in Figure 9.  The per capita consumption of workers is greater from that of 
period 1 in periods 2 to 4 (see Figure 9a) when workers own more houses and land both in the 
long run and short run (see Figure 9c, e). In contrast, the consumption of retirees decreases 
from period 2 and reaches its lowest point in period 3 (see Figure 9b). Although consumption 
rises from period 3 to 4, the long run per capita consumption is still below that of period 1 (the 
original state). Similar situations also happen in both the house and land owned by retirees on 
a per capita basis (see Figure 9d, f). 
The results in Figure 9 show that, relative to period 1 (the original state), the utility of workers 
is higher; however, the retirees’ utility is worse than their original state. We next discuss the 
retirees’ utility since workers’ behavior is influenced by the expectations of their retired life. 
For retirees, in the long run, the decrease in utility is due to the increase in longevity which 
in turn raises the population of retirees. Compared with the case of no increase in longevity, 
the population of retirees rises by 12.5 percent. When the population rises, to keep the same 
utility level as before, it requires a rise of total income. However, the simulation indicates that 
in the long-run total income of retirees will rise by less than 1 percent thus per capita income 
and the utility of retirees fall. 
During the transition period, the significant utility loss of retirees is due to the decline in the 
fertility rate. This decline leads to fewer workers and a concomitant rise in the proportion of 
retirees. Especially in period 3, the proportion of retirees would reach its peak (see Figure 2f), 
meaning that the pension income from workers would be shared by more retirees, leading to 
the most drastic losses in utility. After that, this utility will rise along with a decline in the 
proportion of retirees (see Figure 2f), and move towards its long run level. 
 
Figure 9. The Utility Dynamics (per capita) 
Note: the corresponding demographic changes are presented in Figure 2, both the fertility rate decline and longevity increase 
happen from period 2 to 3. 
For the workers, their behavior would be influenced by their expectations about the living 
standard of their retirement. In the long-run, the higher utility is due to the increased savings 
of workers. Recall that the utility loss would happen in households’ retiree period, the workers 
with rational expectation would increase their savings to fund their retirement so as to 
maximize their life-span utility. Specifically, the households, having perfect foresight of their 
future utility loss, would purchase more house and land when they are workers, and sell them 
when they retire. This purchase behavior against the future utility loss raises the house and land 
owned by workers and with it their utility. 
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During the transition period, the better utility of workers comes from the fertility rate decline. 
Because of the fertility rate decline, the worker population decreases accordingly. However, 
the total income of workers will not decrease to the same extent. The key driver here is the 
wealth stock of the firms, including 𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 , 𝐾𝐾ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1  and 𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1  (see equation (10) and (11)). 
When worker population declines, the adjustments of the wealth are not immediate, indicating 
higher per worker output in goods and houses. According to equation (16), higher per worker 
output and wealth stock translates into the income of workers through wages and profits. Thus, 
higher per capita income would accrue to workers, and their utility increases. Along with the 
adjustment of the wealth stock, workers’ utility will tend to converge towards its long run level.  
Based on the discussion above, we note that an aging population would increase inequality 
across generations. The utility of workers increases whereas that of the retirees falls. Especially 
in the transition periods, this growth in inequality would be significant. In these periods, as has 
been illustrated above, the significant aging population and the wealth stock adjustment would 
drive a wedge between the two generations. 
The results of this section can be concluded as follows: 
Result 4: the aging population could cause utility inequality across generations. 
Specifically, the utility of workers would rise while that of retirees would fall.  
5.2. Prices 
The price dynamics following the demographic changes presented in Figure 2 is explained 
next. The house price rises from period 1 to 2, and then declines from period 2 to 4 (see Figure 
10). Similarly, the land price also rises from period 1 to 2, and declines from period 2 to 4 (see 
Figure 11).  
 
Figure 10. the Overall Dynamics of House Price 
Note: the corresponding demographic changes are presented in Figure 2, both the fertility rate decline and longevity increase 
happen from period 2 to 3. After that, the fertility rate moves back to the replacement level, while the longevity stays stable. 
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Figure 11. the Overall Dynamics of Land Price 
Note: the corresponding demographic changes are presented in Figure 2, both the fertility rate decline and longevity increase 
happen from period 2 to 3. After that, the fertility rate moves back to the replacement level, while the longevity stays stable. 
As shown in Figure 10 and 11, the price dynamics produce a turning point at period 2. Before 
this point, both prices are rising; however, after this point, both the prices fall. What is the 
mechanism that connects the demographic change to the price movements? 
To explain these dynamics, the Euler Equations of house and land are listed: 
𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(exp (𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞,1+𝑡𝑡) 𝑞𝑞�1+𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ) 𝑐𝑐1,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐2,1+𝑡𝑡) + 𝑗𝑗ℎ 𝑐𝑐1,𝑡𝑡ℎ�1,𝑡𝑡   (24) 
𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �exp (𝑔𝑔pl,1+t) 𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,1+𝑡𝑡  𝑐𝑐1,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐2,1+𝑡𝑡� + 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑐1,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙1,𝑡𝑡   (25) 
, where the variables with a tilde denote their de-trended values.  
According to equations (24) and (25), the price dynamics are explained by the utility changes 
of households, which are presented in Figure 9. More concretely, we will emphasize that the 
utility changes are driving prices to rise before the turning point. 
As shown in Figure 9b, the per capita consumption of retirees would decline significantly 
from period 2 to 3. Given the assumption of perfect foresight of households, their behaviors 
would change accordingly and beforehand. The expected decline in consumption is denoted by 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑐𝑐2,1+𝑡𝑡). According to (24) and (25), the decline of 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑐𝑐2,1+𝑡𝑡) will raise the house and land 
prices (𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡) beforehand. Therefore, if the expected consumption decline would happen 
from period 2 to 3, then the price rises would precede period 2. This mechanism explains the 
price rise before the turning point. 
Intuitively, as explained in the household utility section, expectations are the driver of this 
price rise. When consumption decline is anticipated, the households raise their savings by 
purchasing more housing and land when they are workers (see Figure 9c, e). It is these 
purchases which finally lead to the price rise. 
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After the turning point at period 2, both the prices start decreasing. This decrease is largely 
driven by the drag from the drop in the fertility rate, which has been explained in the previous 
section. Here, two issues may be noted. 
First, the decline lasts for two periods, from period 2 to 4. This length is different from the 
fertility rate decline, which only happens from period 2 to 3. Why? The key driver of this 
phenomenon is the character of stock of wealth, which prevents the price from declining 
sharply. As discussed previously, the stock of wealth would not adjust immediately against a 
decline in the population of workers. Therefore, with these wealth stocks, the per capita income 
of workers in period 3 rises. More house and land would be purchased by using these incomes, 
and these purchases are supporting the price of these assets. In sum, the stock of wealth is 
playing role as a buffer for the prices. 
Second, during this decline, the house price overshoots before settling to its long run level 
(see Figure 10, period 3 to 4). Why? The mechanism will be illustrated based on equation (24), 
in which two reasons are provided. The consumption decline is the main reason for the price 
decline. As shown in equation (24), the per capita worker consumption 𝑐𝑐1,𝑡𝑡 is positively related 
to the house price. When the consumption declines, the house price would also decline. In our 
simulation, the consumption decline is shown in Figure 9a from period 3 to 4. Simultaneously, 
the house price would decline based on equation (24). 
The further decline of house price is explained from changes in the house stock. To illustrate, 
we should notice that the house stock ℎ�1,𝑡𝑡 is not adjusting simultaneously with the consumption 
(see Figure 9c). Because of the depreciation character of house stock, the adjustment would 
not be immediate, but take place gradually. Based on (24), a higher ℎ�1,𝑡𝑡 indicates a lower house 
price. Thus, in period 4, because ℎ�1,𝑡𝑡 is higher than its long run level, the price would have a 
further fall. This mechanism enriches the discussion about overshooting phenomena that 
started with Dornbusch (1976). 
In sum, connections between demographic changes and price dynamics are presented above, 
and these connections could be summarized by the following result: 
Result 5: aging population could cause a turning point in housing prices. 
Although this result is based on the specific demographic changes presented in the previous 
section, it corresponds well with reality and is theoretically grounded as shown in Figure 8– an 
issue under current investigation.  
6. Conclusion 
The effect of an aging population on housing prices remains an unresolved issue with mixed 
empirical findings. This debate began with Mankiw and Weil (1989) and has been ongoing for 
the past two decades. Here we build an overlapping generations model where aging results 
from a combination of a decline in fertility and an increase in longevity to simulate effects of 
the above on housing prices. Our simulations for plausible parameter values give mixed results, 
depending on which of the above-mentioned overwhelms in terms of the impact of aging on 
house (and land) prices.   
This paper has tackled the impact of aging on housing prices from a theoretical perspective. 
Our result provides reasons for the mixed results shown through empirical studies.  It shows 
that a decline in the fertility rate depresses housing prices while an increase in longevity does 
the opposite – the net effect of a simultaneous change in the above two factors depends on 
which effect is overwhelming. Note that aging is caused by a combination of a fall in fertility 
with an increase in longevity, but the exact magnitude of the afore-mentioned differs across 
contexts. More concretely, in the long run, housing prices will decline if the drag of a fall in 
fertility outweighs the push from an increase in longevity, and vice versa. This result may 
explain the mixed findings from existing empirical research. 
If indeed true, then what does the above imply for the price trends for housing in the future? 
Our simulations predict a sharp turning point in housing prices in a generation when the upward 
effect is overwhelmed by the current declines in the rate of fertility. This turning point is 
revealed by the simulations and explained theoretically. Before this turning point, the prices 
would rise in anticipation of a longer life span by existing population of workers and thus the 
need for more wealth to fund retirement. Nevertheless, the decline afterwards is due to the 
decrease of worker population caused by the lower fertility rate of the current period. Thus, 
these price declines would continue through the process of aging population caused by the 
fertility rate decline.  
Furthermore, household behavior has also been discussed in this paper, and the analysis 
showed that the demographic changes would lead to welfare inequality across generations. 
More concretely, the utility of workers will be higher; however, that of retirees will be lower 
(see Figure 9). This inequality would be most significant during the transition periods.  
In sum, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of aging – a phenomenon that is 
spreading across the world – which will affect housing prices but the exact magnitudes will 
differ by context and change with time.  The next challenge, which is part of ongoing research, 
is to test these predictions using data on aging societies. These findings will deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between aging and the economy. 
 
 
  
Appendix A. per capita Version Model Equations 
The per capita version model equations are transformed from the corresponding aggregate 
equations, and the derivation is based on Eq. (1), (2), (3) in the demography section. 
Households: For each generation, the budget constraint is shown by variables in lower case 
denoting per capita amount of that generation. 
𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡,1 = (1 − 𝑇𝑇)(𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)   (A1) 
𝑐𝑐1+𝑡𝑡,2 + 𝑞𝑞1+𝑡𝑡ℎ1+𝑡𝑡,2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,1+𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙1+𝑡𝑡,2 = 𝑞𝑞1+𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ)( ℎ𝑡𝑡,1𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑡,2𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡) + 𝑇𝑇(𝑑𝑑1+𝑡𝑡 + 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,1+𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐,1+𝑡𝑡 +
𝑛𝑛ℎ,1+𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤ℎ,1+𝑡𝑡) 𝑛𝑛1+𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,1+𝑡𝑡(𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡,1𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡,2𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡)   (A2) 
Firms: For firms, the variables in lower case represent the amount per worker.  
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 )𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐  𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐    (A3) 
ih𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴ℎ,𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 )𝜇𝜇ℎ  (𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 )𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙  𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡1−𝜇𝜇ℎ−𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙    (A4) 
𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿kc) 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + ik𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡    (A5) 
𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿kh) 𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + ikℎ,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜙𝜙ℎ,𝑡𝑡     (A6) 
𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐�𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1� = 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐2 (𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡)2 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡     (A7) 
𝜙𝜙ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜙𝜙ℎ�𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1� = 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘ℎ2 (𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝐺𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡)2 𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡    (A8) 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 ih𝑡𝑡 + 1−𝛿𝛿kc𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 +(1 − 𝛿𝛿kh) 𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡     (A9) 
Equilibrium: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 + ik𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + ikℎ,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡    (A10) 
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = ih𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ) ℎ𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡     (A11) 
𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡   (A12) 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,2, ℎ𝑡𝑡 = ℎ𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ℎ𝑡𝑡,2, 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡,2. 
Appendix B. Trends 
The Method of Calculating Trends 
When we say a variable has trend, we mean it satisfies the following equation: 
𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡    (B1) 
Where 𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡 and 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 are denoting the steady state and trend of the variable 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 at period t. 
In an equation consists of multiple variables, their trends could be related with each other. In 
this study, these relationships will be shown by using the growth rates of trends. For 
computational convenience, we define the growth rates of variables by their log-difference, 
i.e.: 
𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡 = ln(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) − ln(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1)    (B2) 
And thus 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1
= exp�𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡�     (B3) 
When the growth rate is small, 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡 is approximately equal to 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 .   
In addition, the calculations of trend relationships are based on the following two 
assumptions: 
1) The de-trended variables (steady states) do not have the same trend.  
2) Trends are determined by exogenous variables. 
Based on the above assumptions, we discuss the relationship of trends in two kinds of 
equations: linear and Cobb Douglas form. The linear equation has the form as follows: 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋2,𝑡𝑡     (B4) 
The parameters 𝑀𝑀 and b are constant or exogenous variables without trend. Supposing the 
trend of  𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 is 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡, the above equation can be derived as follows: 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
= 𝑀𝑀 𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡
𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏 𝑋𝑋2,𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  
𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑋𝑋�1,𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋�2,𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  
The 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡 and 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡 are trends of 𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑋𝑋2,𝑡𝑡 respectively. We will prove that 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡 =
𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 . If not, suppose the trend growth rates are positive constants13, i.e. 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = (exp (𝑔𝑔))𝑡𝑡 >0,𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡 = (exp (𝑔𝑔1))𝑡𝑡 > 0,𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡 = (exp (𝑔𝑔2))𝑡𝑡 > 0, the equation can be rewritten as follows: 
𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑋𝑋�1,𝑡𝑡(exp (𝑔𝑔1)exp (𝑔𝑔) )𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑋𝑋�2,𝑡𝑡(exp (𝑔𝑔2)exp (𝑔𝑔) )𝑡𝑡 
The inequality of trends indicates that the growth rates are not equal. If 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 < 𝑔𝑔, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, the 
steady states must have trend included to satisfy the equation and thus violate the assumption 
one. The situation is the same if 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 > 𝑔𝑔, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2.  
In case 𝑔𝑔1 > 𝑔𝑔 and 𝑔𝑔2 < 𝑔𝑔, the absolute value of 𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡 will grow faster than that of 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡. To 
hold the equation, trend in steady states have to be included and thus violate the assumption 
(1) again. The proof of other situations are similar. 
According to the second assumption, the trends are determined by exogenous variables, thus 
the relationship among the trends can be described by certain equations. In the linear case 
above, this relationship can be written as 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡. Because this equation holds for 
every period t, their growth rates should equal to each other, i.e.: 
𝑔𝑔1,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔2,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡     (B4’) 
The Cobb-Douglas form equation that we are focusing is shown as follows: 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑋𝑋2,𝑡𝑡−1𝑏𝑏      (B5) 
Divide both sides of the equation by 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  (the trend of 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) and we derive the equation as 
follows: 
𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑋𝑋2,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 �𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡�𝑎𝑎 �𝑋𝑋2,𝑡𝑡−1𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡 �𝑏𝑏 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑋�1,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 � 𝑋𝑋�2,𝑡𝑡−1exp (𝑔𝑔2,𝑡𝑡)�𝑏𝑏 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  
With this derivation, we want to prove 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 . If not, the term 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  will be more or 
less than 1. Suppose the growth rates of trends are constants, the value of this term will continue 
rising or diminishing. To hold the equation, the steady states will have trend involved and thus 
violate the second assumption.  
Taking log-difference operation on both sides of 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 , we have: 
𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝑀𝑀�𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺1,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝑏𝑏(𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺2,𝑡𝑡−1) 
According to Eq. (B2), the above equation can be written as: 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀 𝑔𝑔1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏 𝑔𝑔2,𝑡𝑡     (B5’) 
In case that the equation is:  
                                                 
13 Because the trends are determined, the growth rates have to be determined too. 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋1,𝑡𝑡𝑋𝑋2,𝑡𝑡     (B6) 
The derivation is similar, and we have: 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔2,𝑡𝑡     (B6’) 
The Trends in the Model 
The exogenous variables in our model has been listed in Table 2. Among them, we assume 
the longevity increase have no trend effect on other variables, and its effects are all captured 
by steady state changes. In addition, we assume that the per worker labour supplies, 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 and 
𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡, do not have trends. The trends of other variables are calculated as follows. 
The per worker land area is calculated as: 
𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁1,𝑡𝑡 
Denote the growth rates of worker population and land area by 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡 and 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡 respectively, the 
per worker land area growth rate can be calculated according to Eq. (B5’) as: 
𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡     (B7) 
In case that the land area is fixed, we will assume that 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡 = 0 and omit it in the equations. 
Here, we keep this variable in equations to check its relationships with the trends of other 
variables. 
According to Eq. (A12) and (B4’), the variables 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 have the same trend growth rate as 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡, 
i.e. 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡. Based on Eq. (A9) and (B4’), the terms 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 have the same growth rate as 
the variable 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, and this relationship can be described by: 
𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡    (B8) 
We have known 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 (see Eq. (B7)), if we can describe 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 using exogenous variables, the 
trend growth rate of land price 𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 would be calculated according to the above equation. 
Use Eq. (A3) and (B5’), 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 can be calculated as: 
𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡    (B9) 
Use Eq. (B8) and (B9), the 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 can be described as: 
𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 = 11−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 +  𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡   (B10) 
Thus, according to Eq. (B8), the trend growth rate of land price is: 
𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = 11−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 +  𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + (𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡)   (B11) 
Next, we will derive the trend growth rate of house price. According to Eq. (A4) and (B5’), 
the trend growth rate of ih𝑡𝑡 is: 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑎𝑎ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡    (B12) 
From Eq. (A9), (B4’) and (B6’), we can get: 
𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞,𝑡𝑡     (B13) 
Based on Eq. (B7), (B10), (B12) and (B13), the trend growth rates of house and house price 
are: 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾ah,t +  𝜇𝜇ℎ1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾ac,t +  𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝜇𝜇ℎ1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾ak,t − 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙(𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡)   (B14) 
𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞,𝑡𝑡 = 1−𝜇𝜇ℎ1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾ac,t − 𝛾𝛾ah,t + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐(1−𝜇𝜇ℎ)1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝛾𝛾ak,t + 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙�𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡�  (B15) 
Assuming that all the exogenous variables are zero except fertility rate, the trend growth rates 
above can be written as follows: 
𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = −𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡      (B16) 
𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡      (B17) 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = −𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡     (B18) 
𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡     (B19) 
Because 𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡 = 0 in this circumstance, according to budget constraint equations in Appendix 
A, the variable such as wages, profits, consumptions and capitals also have no trend. 
Meanwhile, based on the equations of the Equilibrium in Appendix A, the variables 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡,1, 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡,2 
and 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡 have the same trend growth rate as 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡. Similarly, the variables ℎ𝑡𝑡,1, ℎ𝑡𝑡,2 and ℎ𝑡𝑡 have the 
same trend growth rate as 𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑡.  
Appendix C. De-trended Equations and First Order Conditions 
Using the equations in Appendix B, the equations in Appendix A can be written in de-trended 
form. We list these equations as follows, as well as the de-trended first order conditions of 
households and firms. 
Households:  
?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡ℎ�𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡,1 = (1 − 𝑇𝑇)(𝑤𝑤�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤�ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛�ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + ?̃?𝑑𝑡𝑡)   (C1) 
?̃?𝑐1+𝑡𝑡,2 + 𝑞𝑞�1+𝑡𝑡ℎ�1+𝑡𝑡,2 + 𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,1+𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙1+𝑡𝑡,2 = 𝑞𝑞�1+𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ)( ℎ�𝑡𝑡,1𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑔𝑔ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡ℎ�𝑡𝑡,2𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑔𝑔ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1)) +
𝑇𝑇(?̃?𝑑1+𝑡𝑡 + 𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐,1+𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤�𝑐𝑐,1+𝑡𝑡 + 𝑛𝑛�ℎ,1+𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤�ℎ,1+𝑡𝑡) 𝑛𝑛1+𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,1+𝑡𝑡( 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡,1𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡,2𝜋𝜋1+𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1)) 
 (C2) 
First Order Conditions of Households: 
The households choose the following variables: 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡,1,ℎ𝑡𝑡,1, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡,1,𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡, 𝑐𝑐1+𝑡𝑡,2,ℎ1+𝑡𝑡,2, 𝑙𝑙1+𝑡𝑡,2. 
The utility maximization of households have the first-order conditions as follows: 
𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡,1 = 𝑗𝑗ℎℎ�𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝛽𝛽(1−𝛿𝛿ℎ) 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝�𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑞,𝑡𝑡+1� 𝑞𝑞�1+𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐1̃+𝑡𝑡,2     (C3) 
𝑞𝑞�1+𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐1̃+𝑡𝑡,2 = 𝑗𝑗ℎℎ�1+𝑡𝑡,2      (C4) 
𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡,1 = 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝�𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1� 𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,1+𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐1̃+𝑡𝑡,2     (C5) 
𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,1+𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐1̃+𝑡𝑡,2 = 𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙ℎ,1+𝑡𝑡,2      (C6) (1−𝑇𝑇)𝑤𝑤�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡,1 = 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉 (𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡1+𝜉𝜉 + 𝑛𝑛�ℎ,𝑡𝑡1+𝜉𝜉)𝜂𝜂−𝜉𝜉1+𝜉𝜉    (C8) (1−𝑇𝑇)𝑤𝑤�ℎ,𝑡𝑡
𝑐𝑐?̃?𝑡,1 = 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛�ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉 (𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡1+𝜉𝜉 + 𝑛𝑛�ℎ,𝑡𝑡1+𝜉𝜉)𝜂𝜂−𝜉𝜉1+𝜉𝜉    (C9) 
Firms:  
𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 )𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐  𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡1−𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐     (C10) 
ıh� 𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴ℎ,𝑡𝑡 (𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 )𝜇𝜇ℎ  ( 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1))𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙  𝑛𝑛�ℎ,𝑡𝑡1−𝜇𝜇ℎ−𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙   (C11) 
𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿kc) 𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + ık� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡     (C12) 
𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝛿kh) 𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + ık� ℎ,𝑡𝑡     (C13) 
 𝜙𝜙�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜙𝜙𝑐𝑐�𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1� = 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐2 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡( 𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 − 1)2𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1   (C14)          
𝜙𝜙�ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜙𝜙ℎ�𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1� = 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘ℎ2 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡( 𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1 − 1)2𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1   (C15) 
Here, 𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑔𝑔𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾,𝑡𝑡 are assumed to equal to the fertility rate 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡.  
?̃?𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤�ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛�ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙�ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡 + 𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡 ıh� 𝑡𝑡 + (1 −
𝛿𝛿kc) 𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿kh) 𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡)   (C16) 
First Order Conditions of Firms: 
The firms will decide on the following variables: 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡,𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡. The first order 
condition with respect to 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 is: 
𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒�
1−𝛿𝛿kc
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1
−𝜙𝜙� (0,1)(𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+1,𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡)+?̃?𝑟𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+1�
𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡+1
= 1𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡+𝜙𝜙� (1,0)(𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1)
𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡
  (C17) 
Where:  
?̃?𝑟𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑦𝑦�(1,0)(𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+1) = 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡+1𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡     (C18) 
𝜙𝜙�(0,1)�𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+1,𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡� = −𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+12 ((𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+1𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 )2 − 1)    (C19) 
𝜙𝜙�(1,0)(𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1) = 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡( 𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−1 − 1)     (C20) 
Similarly, the first order condition with respect to 𝑘𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑡 is: 
𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒�
1−𝛿𝛿kh
𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+1
−𝜙𝜙� (0,1)(𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1,𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡)+?̃?𝑟ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1�
𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡+1
= 1+𝜙𝜙� (1,0)(𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1)
𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡
  (C21) 
Where:  
?̃?𝑟ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑞𝑞1+𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤ℎ� (1,0,0)(𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛�ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1, 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡) = 𝜇𝜇ℎ 𝑞𝑞�1+𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤ℎ�𝑡𝑡+1𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡   (C22) 
𝜙𝜙(0,1)�𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1,𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡� = −𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡+12 ((𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡+1𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡 )2 − 1)    (C23) 
𝜙𝜙(1,0)�𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡,𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1� = 𝜙𝜙𝑘𝑘ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡( 𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡−1 − 1)     (C24) 
The first order condition with respect to 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 is: 
𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑�𝑡𝑡
= 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝�𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1� (𝑝𝑝�𝑙𝑙,1+𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛1+𝑡𝑡 +?̃?𝑟𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1)
𝑑𝑑�1+𝑡𝑡
     (C25) 
Here,  
?̃?𝑟𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑞𝑞�1+𝑡𝑡ıh� (0,0,1)�𝑘𝑘�ℎ,𝑡𝑡,𝑛𝑛�ℎ,1+𝑡𝑡, 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡� = 𝜇𝜇ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝�𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡+1�  𝑞𝑞�1+𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤ℎ�𝑡𝑡+1𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡  (C26) 
The first order conditions with respect to 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑛𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑡 are: 
𝑤𝑤�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐) 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡      (C27) 
𝑤𝑤�ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝜇𝜇ℎ − 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙) 𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤ℎ�𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛�ℎ,𝑡𝑡      (C28) 
Equilibrium: 
𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡 = ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 + ık� 𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + ık� ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙�𝑡𝑡     (C29) 
ℎ�𝑡𝑡 = ıh� 𝑡𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿𝛿ℎ) ℎ�𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑔𝑔ℎ,𝑡𝑡)     (C30) 
𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡     (C31) 
where ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 = ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡,2, ℎ�𝑡𝑡 = ℎ�𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ℎ�𝑡𝑡,2, 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡,1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙ℎ,𝑡𝑡,2. 
Appendix D. Method in Calculating Dynamics of Variables 
When we calculate the dynamics of a variable, we first calculate the growth rates of trends 
and steady states separately, and then add them together. For example, if we interest in the 
growth rate of a variable, this growth rate can be represented as follows: 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡    (D1) 
Where the variable 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 denotes the growth rate of trend at time t, and the growth rate of 
steady state at time t is denoted by 𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡. The proof of this method is as follows. 
Suppose we have a time varying variable X and the trend of this variable is denoted by G, 
then the steady state 𝑋𝑋� satisfies the equation as follows: 
𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡 = 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 
Suppose the time is discrete, we take log operation on both sides and derive as follows: ln�𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡� = ln(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) − ln(𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡) 
The same equation in the previous period is: ln�𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡−1� = ln(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1) − ln(𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1) 
Subtract the above two equations, we have the following equation: ln(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) − ln(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1) = (ln(𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡) − ln(𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1)) + �ln�𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡� − ln�𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡−1�� 
According to Eq. (B2), the equation above can be rewritten as: 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 
Similarly, if we interest in the changes of a variable comparing with its original state, it can 
be calculated by the following equation: ln(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) − ln(𝑋𝑋0) = (ln(𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡) − ln(𝐺𝐺0)) + �ln�𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡� − ln�𝑋𝑋�0��  (D2) 
As shown above, the overall changes can be represented by the sum of the changes in trend 
and steady states.        # 
Appendix E. Robust Test 
In this section, we will examine the robustness of long-term effect of an increase in longevity 
on housing prices. Specifically, we change the calibrated parameter values to assess their 
effects on the numerical outcomes. More concretely, each calibrated parameter incremented by 
10 percent and the effects on house (and land) prices assessed. To make the results comparable 
to the original one, the same demographic change would be applied, i.e. survival rate rise from 
0.8 to 0.9. If the above results about longevity increase is robust, then the parameter changes 
should only make modest changes on the result.  
   
Figure E1. Robust Test: Effect of Longevity Increase on Land Price 
Notes: From left to right, the first bar in chart is the land price change when parameters are calibrated to their original values. 
Then, we change the parameter values one by one. Each parameter is increased by 10 percent comparing with their original 
values. For example, we could increase the capital depreciation rate of non-housing sector by 10 percent, and the other 
parameter values are unchanged. In this situation, the effect of longevity increase on land price is shown in the second bar. 
 
Figure E2. Robust Test: Effect of Longevity Increase on House Price 
Notes: From left to right, the first bar in chart is the house price change when parameters are calibrated to their original values. 
Then, we change the parameter values one by one. Each parameter is increased by 10 percent comparing with their original 
values. For example, we could increase the capital depreciation rate of non-housing sector by 10 percent, and the other 
parameter values are unchanged. In this situation, the effect of longevity increase on house price is shown in the second bar. 
For the land price, the tests for robustness are shown in Figure E1. Comparing with the 
original result, which is shown at the left most, the price changes are modest. The biggest 
difference lay on the time preference 𝛽𝛽 and tax rate 𝑇𝑇, however, none of their effects is bigger 
than 2 percent. Thus, the numerical solution of land price changes is considered to be robust. 
Similarly, the test for robustness of house price to changes in longevity is shown in Figure 
E2. Like that of the land price, the longevity increase effect on house price would only be 
affected modestly by parameter value changes. Therefore, the result on the house price is also 
robust in this circumstance. 
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